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Global Patterns of Conflict and
the Role of Third Parties
Peter Wallensteen *
I. THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR
A common belief is that the end of the Cold War will mean
the beginning of an entirely new pattern of conflict. The end of
the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the dissolution of the Sovi-
et Union all have meant dramatic and significant changes in the
global system. How fundamental are these changes? How will they
affect global conflict patterns, conflict resolution in general, and
the role of third parties in particular?
Major changes are occurring at this very moment, making
predictions difficult. However, even revolutionary changes have a
history, and might, in retrospect, appear to be a continuation of
already established patterns rather than the formation of entirely
new ones. A retrospective look might illuminate such develop-
ments. With this idea in mind, some possibilities for the near
future can be discussed by observing the trends in conflicts and
conflict resolution during the last few years. For this, detailed data
collection is available.1
A comprehensive study would require more data. For instance,
the study would have to account for the fact that every year there
are more than 100 armed conflicts involving at least 70 govern-
ments and more than 130 nongovernmental armed organizations.2
A study of the goals and origins of these 200 armed actors (and
the many more which are not armed but still have a political
impact) would enable future predictions to be more reliable. Even
without such a study, some trends can be seen and can be expect-
* Dag Hammarskjold Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
This Article reports two on-going projects of the Department of Peace and Conflict Re-
search, Uppsala University: conflict data collection; and the solutions to ethnic conflicts.
1 This is an on-going project reported in publications from the Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, and in S.I.P.R.I. Yearbooks.
2 STATES IN ARMED CONFLICT 1988 (Peter Wallensteen ed., 1990); STATES IN ARMED
CONFLICT 1989 (Karin Lindgren ed., 1991). In such an analysis, the finances, training,
arms supply, and goals of the actors would need to be studied.
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ed to draw the attention of decision-makers and scholars during
the rest of this decade.
3
The data shows a paradox: in general, the number of major
armed conflicts is gradually declining, while at the same time
smaller armed conflicts are increasing. Being more specific, the
following analysis illustrates three trends in conflict patterns, as
well as three developments for conflict resolution.
II. GLOBAL PATTERNS OF CONFLICT
The global conflict patterns are discussed in three categories:
conflicts over the state (state formation wars), conflicts within states
(internal wars); and conflicts between states (international wars).
This trichotomy allows the analysis to focus on the
state/government as one actor that is in conflict with another
government, or, more often, with an armed movement desiring
changes in the government or territory. The focus is on the in-
compatibility of the armed parties involved.
A. State Formation Conflicts Intensify
The available data clearly shows that conflicts over the state
are increasing. In 1988, out of forty major armed conflicts thirty-
five percent were of this character. In 1991, out of thirty-five ma-
jor armed conflicts forty-five percent were of this type.4 As has
been noted, the overall number of armed conflicts with more than
one thousand battle-related deaths is declining slightly, but the
share and absolute number of conflicts over the state are growing.
This same shift can be found when studying conflicts with less
than one thousand battle-related deaths.
A plausible prediction is that the end of the Cold War will
intensify this trend, because the superpowers of the Cold War (the
United States and the Soviet Union) were both strongly against
the dissolution of existing states.5 This attitude has been shared
by most countries when viewing such ambitions in other countries.
3 Cf KARIN LINDGREN ET AL., MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS IN 1990 (1991), which con-
tains a section on conflict trends in the 1980s.
4 Peter Wallensteen, The Security Council in Armed Conflicts, 1986-1991, in STATES IN
ARMED CONFLICT 1990-1991 (Birger Heldt ed., 1992).
5 The confrontational periods of the Cold War resulted in the division of states
along lines imposed by the leading powers (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and China). See
ROBERT K. SCHAFFER, WARPATHS: THE POLITICS OF PARTITION (1990). In detente periods
reunification became possible (e.g., Austria 1955, Germany 1990).
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In fact, since 1947, this particular attitude has had a surprising
international consensus.6 It can be expressed as a slogan: "Don't
touch the states that existl" This view has meant that the interna-
tional community has been unwilling to accept forcefully imple-
mented changes of borders or dissolution of states. Thus, very few
borders changed during the Cold War. The confrontations be-
tween the superpowers concerned the control over entire states
and their governments, rather than particular pieces of territory.
The exception to the rule has, of course, been the decoloni-
zation problematique: the dismantling of the colonial empires of
Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal
was accepted--or even actively promoted-by the United States,
the Soviet Union, and other members of the U.N. system, with the
exception of the colonial states and some closer allies. By defining
those empires as "colonial" (a concept in itself hard to define) the
"colonization" made by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was left outside the
discourse.7 Nevertheless, it should' be noted that the decoloniza-
tion process largely took place without border changes. The units
created by the colonial powers were also those units that became
independent states. The only internationally accepted partitions
that took place, such as between India and Pakistan, were also
those that the parties agreed to and thus were not forcefully im-
posed by the international community of states.
There are some other exceptions to this rule, notably the
recognition of Bangladesh following the 1971 India-Pakistan War.
However, a number of unrecognized forced annexations testify to
the reluctance of other countries to recognize such changes. Ex-
amples of such nonrecognition are Turkey's occupation of Cyprus,
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and incorporation
of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, Indonesia's occupation of
East Timor, Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara, and Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait.'
6 The partition of Biritish India in 1947, as well as the redrawing of borders in
Europe in 1944-47, marked the end of a period of such territorial changes. This has not
halted subsequent border conflicts, but forceful changes have found less international ac-
ceptance.
7 The United States conquered half of Mexico in the first half of the 19th century,
acquired possessions in the Pacific later, and also ruled Cuba and the Philippines follow-
ing "decolonization" of those territories from Spain. Russia acquired large possessions in
Caucasus and central Asia through the end of the 19th century, and again occupied,
incorporated, and kept territories in Eastern Europe in 1940-44. None of this activity was,
however, part of the decolonization agenda.
8 There were almost no international protests to the incorporation of Eritrea into
1992l
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The status quo attitude has meant that a number of situations
have been frozen, as the international community during the Cold
War (i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union) could not agree
to restore the status quo ante bellum. In this respect, the end of the
Cold War has opened new opportunities for conflict resolution.
The 1991 Gulf War was seen as a reaction to a forceful occupation
and change of borders of a state. Clearly, the international com-
munity reacted strongly to this. Even governments sympathetic to
Iraq criticized the actions of August 2, 1990. This, then, is one
effect of the end of the Gold War; it says that blatant occupation
of neighbors still is forbidden.
As the data suggests, there is an entire set of other state for-
mation conflicts stemming from inside the states themselves. More
than before, groups desiring to create their own states are taking
up arms. The near future might see a softening of the status quo
attitude on border issues and state-making. The breakup of the
Soviet Union itself might mean that Russia and other new states
will take a different, less forceful attitude toward such develop-
ments. Thus, the dissolution of the Soviet empire illustrates and
intensifies an important contemporary trend.9 This means that a
number of movements and regions will find it more possible to
arrive at their own state.'0 At the same time, the international
support for maintaining central government control may have
weakened. This phenomenon suggests that the issue of state-build-
ing is likely to be pertinent. Furthermore, the issue involves not
only the creation of new states, but also the construction of a
completely functioning state, probably with some welfare ambitions
separate from the goal of national security. State management also
becomes a difficult task when states are created following a devas-
tating war.
An important aspect of many of the state formation conflicts
is that they relate largely, but not completely, to ethnic identity
issues. Groups are searching for their identity and security in a
Ethiopia in 1960-61, although Eritrea was internationally defined as in union with its
neighbor and not a province.
9 GARY GOERTZ & PAUL F. DIEHL, TERRITORIAL CHANGES AND INTERNATIONAL CON-
FUICTS 54, 87 (1992) (noting the low degree of secessions and unifications in data cov-
ering 1816-1980). In other words, what has happened since 1980 is a break from the
previous patterns, involving secession as well as reunification.
10 In 1990-92 the following new states were declared or en route to becoming de-
clared independent as part of more protracted conflicts: Bougainville, Somaliland, Eritrea,
South Sudan, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovakia, 12 states of the
former Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
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state of their own. An increased ethnic identification, coupled with
perceived or real discrimination in the existing state may have
initiated these conflicts. -Ethnic concentration within a particular
,territory may make creation of a new state an option for ethnic
leaders. ,Thus, there are conflicts which concern the building of
mono-ethnic states as well as multi-ethnic ones. Consequently,
ethnic revival presents a particular challenge likely to require con-
siderable attention in the near future. Very few of the present
states are ethnically homogeneous. There is also considerable
variation in the degree of heterogeneity (Japan is on one extreme
end, P.N.G. is on the other).
One particularly tragic feature of the state formation conflicts
driven by groups demanding a mono-ethnic state is the fate of the
civilian population. These groups tend to deliberately andviolently
attack civilians of the "wrong" ethnicity and drive them from a
particular territory, thereby forcefully creating mono-ethnic areas.
However, their opponents might try to force the civilians to re-
main in the areas in order to maintain an ethnic presence. These
developments run counter, to the ambitions of international hu-
manitarian law, which aims at shielding civilians from war and
protecting the rights of refugees to return to their regions.'
B. Internal Conflicts Beyond the Left-Right Dichotomy
Internal conflicts (i.e. conflicts over government within one
state) have constituted the majority of all major armed conflicts.
Although slightly in decline, these conflicts are likely to remain
the dominant category. A- shift away from a simple Left-Right con-
tinuum of politics to more complex patterns is probable.
The Cold War was a highly interventionist one. Both sides saw
the war as a global struggle between two forms of government (in
a broad sense), meaning that everyone would have to participate
and choose a side. The struggle further implied that each super-
power would be expected to support "its" side in internal conflicts.
Thus, the Cold War had a strongly polarizing effect on interna-
tional politics in military block-building, conventional and nuclear
armaments, civil and military trade. It also affected' internal poli-
tics, dividing the political spectrum into Right-Left, Anti-Commu-
11 On civilians in war, see CHRISTER AHLSTROM & KJELL-AE NORDQUIST, CASUALTIES
OF CONFLiaCr (1991). The wars in tormer Yugoslavia 1991-92 testify to these developments.
19921
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nist versus Communist, Imperialist versus Anti-Imperialist, dichoto-
mies. The resulting global division was one where international
alignments and internal politics strongly correlated. 2 Internal
divisions became international politics, international politics be-
came internal politics. Some of the wars and divisions along these
lines remain after the Cold War (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central
America, China-Taiwan, Korea, Peru, and the Philippines are just a
few examples) and will require considerable energy to settle.
The end of the Cold War, therefore, also has repercussions
for internal politics and patterns of conflict, particularly in Eastern
and Central Europe, but also, for instance, in Africa. The interre-
lation between international alignments and internal politics will,
almost by definition, cease because no Communist pole of the
Soviet type remains. Rather, we might witness variations of market
economies and democracies, which less distinctly fall into polarized
patterns. The reductionism in theory and practice that marked the
Cold War will no longer be as striking. The complexities in analy-
sis will increase. The new states, as well as the reconstruction of
old ones, may result in interesting new societal configurations.
Some countries are likely to retain features of state control, while
others may become strongly authoritarian under market condi-
tions. Still others might develop open and liberal societies. Thus,
the 1990s should evidence an unusual set of real time experiments
in market integration, democracy building, and state control. The
"end result" (in a history without end) is difficult to project. If
these experiments are combined with a continued high level of
military expenditures and a more "commercial" international arms
trade, serious conflicts may arise in some areas.
Religious mobilization has been noted in the media and
among scholars as one new phenomenon. The Iranian Revolution
in 1979 made the Western world more conscious of the issue.
However, this radicalization is not an aspect of Islam as a whole,
as Islam encompasses a great number of countries. Only a minori-
ty of all Moslems are found in the Middle East. Nor is the phe-
nomenon a feature of Islam alone. Forms of political revival of
religion are found in Hinduism (in India), Buddhism (in Sri Lan-
ka), Judaism (in Israel), and Christianity (in Northern Ireland, the
former Yugoslavia, and Lebanon). The religious revival sometimes
12 See PETER WALLENSTEEN, STRuCTURE AND WAR: ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1920-1968 (1973) for an analysis. This pattern was clear already in the division of Europe
in the late 1940s.
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conflicts with state-building ambitions, as religious arguments
might be used to create political units different from existing
ones. The revival may also clash with democracy because religious
convictions may be more widespread than secular political ones,
and could thus come to power through majority rule. This should
have happened in Algeria in 1991-92 if democracy had been al-'
lowed to flourish. Conflict data trends indicate that religion will be
a force of its own in the near future. Religion was part of the
Cold War confrontation, where, for instance, atheism was an issue.
Thus, religion is a part of life that also enters into armed con-
flicts.1
3
Military dictatorships have been a continuous plague, some-
times related to the Cold War, sometimes not. The 1960s and
1970s were marked by a series of military governments controlling
South America, and all were withdrawing in the face of popular
opposition, international attention, and economic mismanagement
in the 1980s. Military coups have been rare in the last few years.
Moreover, struggling domestic economies in new or reformed
countries challenge the military government as an institution and
a philosophy. New states may need to consider alternative defense
structures in the face of the military government's decline. 4
The new forms of government mean that international in-
volvement takes new forms. For example, to an outside power it
will no longer be so obvious which side to support in a regional
or intraregional dispute. For the major countries with interven-
tionist military capability (today only the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France) the incentives for intervention differ and
will relate to more narrow, particular interests. In a world where
foreign troops are no longer seen as altruistic liberators, but rath-
er are identified along national or religious lines (both by the
intervenor and by those it supports) the temptations to intervene
in internal conflicts are severely reduced. Furthermore, increasing
isolationism of many leading states implies that interest in inter-
13 On the difficulties of defining a "religious conflict," see Kjell-Ake Nordquist, Rdi-
gion and Armed Conflic4 in STATES IN ARMED CONFLICT 1989 (Karin Lindgren ed., 1991).
14 Military government seems particularly common in new states, which express "na-
tional interest" doctrines. Such governments are also some of the few action-oriented in-
stitutions in new states. Thus, South America in the early 1800s, Eastern Europe in the
1920s, and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s saw a large number of military takeovers. The
popular presidential rule doing away with parliamentary institutions in Peru in 1992 could
be a sign of the emerging complexities.
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vention in general, and in choosing sides in particular, will de-
cline."5
C. Interstate Conflicts Few But Intense
The number of interstate armed conflicts has declined in the
last few years, and these conflicts have consistently constituted less
than one tenth of all major armed conflicts. However, the intensi-
ty of such wars, once they escalate, strongly differentiates them
from the internal conflicts discussed above, as evidenced by the
Iran-Iraq Gulf War of the 1980s and the 1991 Gulf War against
Iraq.
During the Cold War, although the number of interstate wars
were few, the stakes were high. The presence of nuclear weapons
bears testimony to that. Wars between two states can more easily
and more quickly reach higher levels of intensity than other situa-
tions, regardless of whether the parties are equipped with conven-
tional or nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the fear of a major war
contributes to caution. The essence of balance of power then is
not necessarily the strength of the force on the other side, but the
fear of the unpredictable consequences of initiating war in gener-
al. 16
The strongly polarized pattern of the Cold War might have
had an impact on interstate wars. While there were a large num-
ber of military confrontations and threats between the major pow-
ers, there were no clashes of regular forces. The confrontations
were localized to Third World territories or to clandestine intelli-
gence operations. Even so, such confrontations were contained
from escalating, resulting instead in partiiions of countries and
regions.
What then happens after the Cold War? New opportunities
have been created for nuclear, chemical, and biological disarma-
ment. The major powers have signed agreements detailing the
15 This observation builds upon the current situation, but it will likely remain the
same fdr the near future. For example, Russia clearly gives priority to internal economic
reconstruction and relations with the new neighbors; in the United States, the political
agenda (from both major parties) points in the direction of internal reform; and in
China, the leadership continues to be torn between a desire for economic growth and
fear of democratization.
16 This is not the place for a debate on the nuclear deterrence-"long peace" issue.
A number of explanations can be advanced for the absence of major power wars since
1934. See THE LONG POSTWAR PEACE: CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS AND PROJECTIONS
(Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1991). One possibility is that the arms race itself served as a
substitute for war: the one with the most weapons wins.
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elimination of large amounts and entire categories of weapons.
The major powers have targeted arms industries-particularly in
the East-as the subjects of conversion plans. The result is a re-
duction of armaments designed for interstate warfare. With disar-
mament, new problems have to be tackled. Countries must now
struggle with the technical and economic dimensions of weapons
destruction', the future of competent engineers, and the dangers
of proliferation. Disarmament means that fewer resources are
available for the development of "sophisticated" weapons or weap-
ons of mass destruction.
The disarmament of the major powers does not mean that
the dangers of proliferation have subsided nor that the threat of
interstate conflict has been eliminated. A great number of unset-
fled border conflicts remain. Moreover, new connections between
internal politics and international affairs (through ethnicity, reli-
gion, and state formation issues) may lead to new inter-state con-
frontations. In a world with increasing economic difficulties and
where the demands on available resources consistently accumulate
(real or imagined), resources in border areas or in open waters
may represent future regions of tension and conflict.
The emergence of new economic systems also represents a
source of potential conflict. The integration of "new" systems (as
are now under construction in Eastern Europe and Africa) with
existing systems creates tensions, principally within the "new" sys-
tems. The inadequacies of market policies in producing expected
goods, as well as the concomitant westernization of the East and
the Third World, may give rise to hostile reactions.
Furthermore, tension between major economic actors could
grow in importance. The increasing regionalization of trade and
the emergence of trading blocs may lead to rivalry between lead-
ing market economies (United States, Japan, and the E.C.). How-
ever, these tensions probably will have little potential of escalating
to military wars, as the integration is high, and the stakes in eco-
nomic exchange (rather than arms) serve as deterrents. 17
In summary, the ending of the Cold War reduces the barriers
against state-formation conflicts, reduces the number of Left-Right
conflicts, allows more room for ethnic and religious conflicts,
increases economic rivalry, reduces major power confrontation,
17 Historically there is little correlation between such economic tensions and major
power wars. For a discussion on power transformation, see A.F.K. ORGANSKI & JACK
KUGLER, THE WAR LEDGER (1980).
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stimulates disarmament, contains the development of weapons of
mass destruction, and has little effect on the absolute number of
interstate conflicts.
III. THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES
Conflict is not only a function of factors promoting conflict
but also of factors favoring conflict resolution. The ending of the
Cold War provides some new developments in this area.
A. New Role for International
Organizations and the United Nations
The current trend is to solicit the aid of international organi-
zations for conflict resolution. In the late 1980s, approximately
one-fourth of all conflicts were confronted openly by global or
regional organizations. In 1991 this amount had increased to ap-
proximately two-fifths.' 8 For example, a significant number of the
peace accords negotiated in 1990-1991 involved the United Na-
tions (U.N.).
During the Cold War, the U.N. was polarized, if not para-
lysed, along the East-West lines. Although the Security Council did
take action on some issues, any action required positive agreement
among the permanent members. Action was taken on several is-
sues, such as decolonization, the arms embargo on South Africa,
the sanctions against Rhodesia, and some Middle East issues like
the resolutions that followed the Arab-Israeli wars. However, with
issues such as European security, Germany, and nuclear disarma-
ment, the permanent members were known to differ and the
issues were never seriously taken to the U.N. Security Council. Ac-
cordingly, the U.N. was not concerned with issues that were seen
as central to the management of world affairs.
The end of the Cold War might have changed the efficacy of
this particular international instrument. Currently, in the Security
Council a clear pattern has emerged in which the permanent
members are working together on many issues or at least are not
obstructing each other. This follows a re-evaluation of the U.N.
that Soviet leader Gorbachev made during the detente period of
the 1980s. A test came when the U.N. was used to handle the
Namibia question. Its relative success led to a number of new
peace-keeping operations in 1991 including those in Angola, Cam-
18 This relates to the U.N. Security Council only. See Wallensteen, supra note 4.
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bodia, Western Sahara, and Yugoslavia. This trend will most likely
continue, particularly if the financial implications are solved in an
orderly way. If so, the Secretary General would acquire a more
significant role than most of his predecessors. Furthermore, the
role of the U.N. could be strengthened by the inward orientation
of the permanent members. For the near future, the members
might be satisfied to leave a great number of issues to the organi-
zation. 19
B. New Organizations
A trend has emerged in which newly created organizations
that have varying degrees of power all share conflict resolution as
a major objective: the C.S.C.E. has a more permanent structure;
the European Community ("E.C."), I.A.E.A., and the Common-
wealth have enlarged functions; the N.A.C.C. has been created as
an extension of NATO; and the Commonwealth of Independent
States ("C.I.S.") as a replacement of the Soviet Union. Other orga-
nizations also take up security issues (e.g., UNICEF). The nongov-
ernmental side is also developing. For instance, some organizations
such as the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
have taken on new functions. New organizations like the Interna-
tional Alert in London and the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia,
have emerged.
The creation of these organizations illustrates an international
commitment to the idea of solving rather than fighting conflicts.
Also, new times might require new organizations. Some of the
older organizations have tried to develop new functions (Common-
wealth, NATO, E.C., I.A.E.A.), while other organizations are en-
tirely new (C.S.C.E. bodies and C.I.S.). It is likely that this insti-
tution-building will continue. For instance, issues such as disarma-
ment and ethnic rights in Europe will require new bodies.
Other organizations of the Cold War era were also colored by
the Cold War. The nonaligned movement created for building
peace between the two blocks, was useful for a time, but later
became an organization pressing Third World demands, particular-
ly on the West. A debate consequently exists regarding this
organization's utility.
19 The most active Secretary General 'was Dag Hammarskj6ld, who managed to make
himself and the organization useful to both superpowers during the Cold War. The
breakthrough for the U.S. public came after his tour to People's Republic of China in.
1955, which led to the freeing of U.S. pilots.
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As a result, a growing number of organizations are now com-
mitted to peace issues and conflict resolution. In fact, a rivalry
might even develop between them as to who should do what. In
some sense, then, a market is being created in which one will
measure the efficacy of different organizations for conflict reso-
lution by the results each can achieve. In former Yugoslavia, a
large number of actors and organizations have worked at conflict
resolution. The E.C. and the U.N. were perhaps the most active,
although they still have been unable to complete the job. The
case of Nagorno-Karabac may present an even more interesting
test, because it is an issue for C.I.S., C.S.C.E., the U.N., and neigh-
boring states.
C. New Consensus Building
Of particular importance for issues of war and peace is the
trend of increasing adherence to international conventions. For
example, the nonproliferation treaty has more signatures than
ever, and the Paris Treaty of 1990 currently covers most of the
countries of C.I.S. Accompanying this trend is an increasing re-
spect for human rights conventions, widespread use of democratic
rules for domestic conflict resolution, and increased attention to
the rights of indigenous peoples. This phenomenon suggests a
consensus on norms. Nevertheless, there are less convincing results
regarding the observance of these norms.
As we have seen, many of the conflicts concern internal af-
fairs, such as repressive governments and ethnic domination. The
increased adherence to principles of human rights, as well as oth-
er conventions giving internationally respected rights to inhabitants
provide new inroads to these conflicts. They become early warning
signals so that international actors may be alerted to arising con-
flicts before they have become too militarized. Human rights issues
have served as an effective vehicle for discussions between oppo-
nents and governments. The emerging consensus on some princi-
ples of conduct is of utmost importance.
Moreover, a proliferation of new actors accompanies this new
consensus. Not only will media have more access, but also nonmili-
tary and nongovernmental organizations and other pressure
groups will come to serve an important function. When the history
of the end of the Cold War is to be written, the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki Act of 1975 will be important. These
gave a legitimate ground for human rights actions, as was seen in
[Vol. 67:14091420
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Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even the Soviet Union.2 Formation
and development of nongovernmental actors are therefore most
significant in the peace-building process.
2 1
The use of internationally supervised elections has been a
successful mechanism for conflict resolution, as evidenced by their
role in the peaceful ending of the Nicaragua conflict, and in the
changes in Eastern Europe. The international supervision is, like-
wise, very important in intrastate conflict situations that involve a
transition from one type of regime to another. Typically, interna-
tional organizations such as the U.N. and Commonwealth, and
private organizations like the.Carter Center, have been responsible.
for arranging electoral supervision.
Overall, after the Cold War, parties other than the states play
an increased role, meaning that international as well as private or-
ganizations surface in a new way. Numerous new organizations are
increasingly important. An increased consensus on norms to guide
conflict resolution has led to the conception that a peaceful solu-
tion is a value in itself, harmonious with other societal values.
Thus, the ending of the Cold War has liberated energy for con-
flict resolution.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES: THE PARADIGMATIC ISSUES
The ending of the Cold War provides the world of the 1990s
with new conflicts, and new instruments for conflict resolution.
Does it, also require new tasks for conflict resolution, or can the
old techniques still be put to use?
Some new challenges are obvious. For example, retraining is
essential. As issues of ethnicity and religion become more impor-
tant than the left-right dichotomy, training in cultural pluralism is
needed. The new conflicts involve forms of analysis quite different
than the simple switch back-and-forth between the "American
view" and the "Soviet view" within a largely similar rationality,
centered on power and its measurement. The United States-Soviet
Union conflict clearly involved the issue of global preeminence, in
which a central feature was the Soviet Union's insistence on: being
an equal.22 Other conflicts are not so easily defined intellectually.
20 It is not far-fetched to suggest that the signs of the break-up of the Soviet empire
were already present at the end of the 1970s, and possibly could have been enhanced by
continued detente, rather than the confrontation that followed du.ring the 1980s.
21 This refers to the creation of civil society as a foundation for democracy, as well
as for peaceful relations between states.
22 This leads to absurd consequences, such as the Soviet ambition to own and do
19921
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There is a need to change from a "centralist" to a "localist"
and "globalist" perspective. As state formation becomes an important
issue, centralist solutions will no longer do. There is a tendency in
conflict resolution work to suggest centralist solutions (federations
and autonomy arrangements) for state formation conflicts. Often
opponents and dissidents see such positions as favoring central
governments, and thus resolution efforts will face severe difficul-
ties. The record shows that there were very few peaceful solutions
to state-formation conflicts in the last few years. We urgently need
to find other forms for solutions. A combined localist and globalist
approach might be useful. However, the need for constructive
future relations between different peoples may outweigh the value
of preserving a particular state at a particular time.
2 3
Some conflicts remain dormant, and others are manifested
only by gradually emerging patterns. Normal procedures of con-
flict resolution may suffice. However, environmental issues will put
conflict resolution to new tests. Some consider these international
consensus issues, and on a superficial level they probably are. In
some cases, they might become issues that bind states or regions
together. But, they also play a role in conflict formation. Environ-
mental degradation that one actor imposes on another can be-
come an important element in conflicts emerging for other rea-
sons, as has been the case for the Baltic peoples in their struggle
for independence from the Soviet Union. Many such issues still
are not on the front pages, but might soon be there. The chal-
lenge posed is the need for foresight, early warning, and early
action aimed at remedying the causes. This might sometimes
mean changing the status quo.
Most third parties will have little power behind their actions.
Yet, as the trends in this Article illustrate, these parties will be
given serious attention despite their lack of power. The third
parties' assets rest more in their impartiality (ability to listen to
both sides and correctly transmit what is being said), ingenuity
(ability to make proposals which meet the ambitions of the con-
flicting sides), and competence (knowledge about the circumstanc-
es). The developments since the ending of the Cold War pose
new challenges to the competence of those involved in third party
everything the United States owned or did, from accumulating nuclear weapons to par-
ticipating in disastrous military interventions in Third World countries.
23 These difficulties have arisen in negotiations concerning Ethiopia-Eritrea, Israel-
Palestine, etc.
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work. Perhaps this is also a challenge to the very framework I have
suggested here.

